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Essay
FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION AND CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM: MISCASTING THE PROBLEM,
RECASTING THE SOLUTION
DEBORAH L. RHODE†
INTRODUCTION
When most Americans think about access to law, their primary
impression is that the country has too much, not too little. Part of the
reason for this perception is the media’s delight in profiling loony
litigation. America faces no shortage in supply of cases that seem too
big for courts, cases that seem too small, and cases that should never
have been cases at all. At one end of the spectrum are megasuits that
ambled along for decades, wreaking financial havoc on all but the
1
lawyers. At the other end of the spectrum are trivial pursuits: football
fans who sued referees,2 prison inmates who wanted a legal right to
3
chunky rather than smooth peanut butter, mothers who asked a court
to resolve a playground shoving match between their three-year-olds,4
fathers prepared to litigate over their fifteen-year-olds’ positions on
5
high school athletic teams, a purchaser of Cracker Jacks who

Copyright © 2004 by Deborah L. Rhode.
† B.A., J.D. Yale University; Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law and Director of the
Center on Ethics, Stanford University. This essay is based on a lecture given as the Seymour
Siegel Memorial Lecture in Ethics at the Duke University School of Law in March 2004. An
earlier version of the essay appears as Chapter 2 in DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE
24–46 (2004).
1. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 83–84 (2000) (outlining the litigation tactics meant to exhaust opponents’
resources).
2. Jerold S. Auerbach, A Plague of Lawyers, HARPER’S, Oct. 1976, at 37, 42.
3. THOMAS BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS 2 (2002).
4. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE LOST ART OF DRAWING THE LINE 14–15 (2001).
5. Dave McKibben, Coaches’ Lineup Could Include a Lawyer, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2003,
at A1.
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6
demanded damages for a missing prize, and a McDonald’s customer
who sought $15,000 for damage to his teeth and marital relations
7
caused by a defective bagel.
Each year in teaching professional ethics, I focus a class session
on litigiousness and begin with highlights from such cases. I describe
the facts and results without linking them together. A prize goes to
any student who correctly matches the claims and outcomes, which
ranged from a six-figure jury verdict to sanctions for a frivolous claim.
Almost no students come close. The following are representative
examples of the disagreement among judges, jurors, and the public
about what constitutes a frivolous lawsuit:
• A purchaser of the porn video “Belle of the Ball” sued the
store in which he bought it on the ground that the featured
actress graced the screen for only ten of seventy-five minutes.
Alleged damages included the cost of medication to treat an
asthma attack “brought on by the stress and strain of being
8
‘ripped off.’”
• A student who spent eleven fruitless years in search of the
perfect state of life promised by Maharishi International
University finally sued the school for fraud. Although the
university had represented that the plaintiff would learn to
fly, he had only learned to hop with legs folded in the lotus
position. And contrary to the school’s claims, chanting in the
method prescribed did not reverse the aging process or
9
enable him to self-levitate.
• A restaurant customer, whose steak arrived well done, not
“medium-well” as requested, voiced dissatisfaction not only
about the meat but also about other aspects of the meal.
When adequate remedies were not forthcoming, he called
the police from his cell phone to get the situation corrected.
The officer who arrived instead told the customer to pay up
and get out, or face arrest. The lawsuit that followed sought
damages from the restaurant owner, the police officer, the

6. HOWARD, supra note 4, at 15.
7. Chris Malcolm, The Case Against a Bagel, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 14, 2003, at 27; David
Grimes, Attack of the Killer Bagels, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Feb. 9, 2003, at E1.
8. Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 848 P.2d 237, 238 (Wyo. 1993). On remand, the trial court
dismissed the case, and the state supreme court affirmed the dismissal. Osborn v. Emporium
Videos, 870 P.2d 382 (Wyo. 1994).
9. See Kropinski v. World Plan Executive Council–U.S., 853 F.2d 948, 950–53 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (reversing a jury verdict and award of $137,890 and remanding for a new trial).
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police department, the chief of police, the town, and the town
10
board and its members.
• A McDonald’s drive-in customer wedged a chocolate
milkshake between his legs as he headed back to the road. In
reaching for french fries on the seat beside him, he
inadvertently squeezed his legs. When the cold milkshake fell
into his lap, the startled driver ploughed into the car in front
of him. The driver of the other car subsequently sued
McDonald’s for failure to warn its customers of the risks of
eating and driving.11
• A student who was fed up when stood up for the high school
prom sued for the cost of her shoes, hairdo, flowers, and
court filing fee.12
• A woman who dried a poodle in her microwave sought
damages from the manufacturer for failure to warn her of the
13
unhappy result.
The existence of these cases, and the varying outcomes and
reactions that they evoke, are emblematic of broader controversies
14
about how much blaming and claiming belongs in the justice system.
I. LEGAL HYPOCHONDRIA: ARGUMENT BY ANECDOTE
Americans are in widespread agreement that the nation has too
much frivolous litigation but there is also broad disagreement about
what falls into that category. About four-fifths of the public,15 and

10. See Schlessinger v. Salimes, 100 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 1996) (dismissing the claim and
ordering sanctions against the plaintiff and his attorney for a frivolous appeal).
11. See JAMES L. PERCELAY, WHIPLASH! AMERICA’S MOST FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS 54
(2000) (summarizing the court’s decision to dismiss the suit but to deny McDonald’s claim for
attorneys’ fees given the plaintiff’s “creative and imaginative” claim).
12. See Quotes, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 30, 30 (reporting that the case was settled for
$81.28, which covered the cost of shoes, hairdo, flowers and court filing fees).
13. See Roger C. Cramton, What Do Lawyer Jokes Tell Us About Lawyers and
Lawyering?, CORNELL L.F., July 1996, at 3, 7 (indicating that the plaintiff recovered damages
from the manufacturer for her unfortunate loss).
14. See RHODE, supra note 1, at 117–31 (describing public perception, media coverage, and
debates surrounding civil litigation).
15. See Greg Pierce, Inside Politics, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at A5 (citing a survey
finding that 83 percent of Americans think that there are too many lawsuits); David G. Savage,
A Trial Lawyer on Ticket Has Corporate U.S. Seeing Red, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 13, 2004, at A1
(citing a poll finding that 80 percent of Americans believe that the nation has too much
litigation).
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16
about four-fifths of surveyed jurors, think that too many meritless
cases are filed. But assessments of merit often differ widely, as is clear
from the varying results in the cases described above. Another apt
example is a Texas multiparty product liability case in which five
juries reached substantially different verdicts after hearing the same
facts.17 Inconsistencies also show up in judicial determinations of
which cases are sufficiently frivolous to warrant sanctions. One
representative study asked nearly three hundred federal judges to
consider one of ten hypothetical claims based on reported decisions.18
In six of the cases, the judges divided almost evenly on whether to
award sanctions.19
Complaints about frivolous litigation, and disputes about how to
define and control it, are by no means a recent phenomenon. For over
three centuries, Americans have fulminated against the bar as “cursed
hungry Caterpillars”20 and plagues of “locusts”21 tormenting the
nation with epidemics of unwarranted litigation and “sapping the
22
vitality” from the free enterprise system. The basis for this diagnosis
is largely anecdotal. It draws heavily on what commentators label
“news as vaudeville”:23 the aberrant, amusing “tort tales”24 like those
noted above.
Such cases receive disproportionate attention, and for obvious
reasons. In an increasingly competitive media market, the line

16. See Jeffrey Abramson, The Jury and Popular Culture, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 515
(2000) (discussing a 1996 report finding that more than 80 percent of jurors “believed that there
were too many frivolous lawsuits”).
17. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 127
(2001).
18. SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 11–15 (1985).
19. Id. at 17.
20. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (2d ed. 1985).
21. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 37.
22. Terry Carter, A Lesson Learned, A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 70, 70 (quoting Thomas J.
Donahue, President and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce); see also Archie W. Dunham,
Speech at the National Press Club (Oct. 28, 2002) (critiquing the tort system for “drain[ing]
billions
of
dollars
from
our
productive
capacity”),
available
at
http://www.conocophillips.com/news/speeches/102802_npc.asp (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
23. Deborah L. Rhode, A Bad Press on Bad Lawyers, in SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL
POLICY, AND THE LAW 139, 147 (Patricia Ewick et al. eds., 1999).
24. WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA,
AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 5–6 (2004). The text accompanying notes 24–40, infra, tracks the
analysis in RHODE, supra note 1, at 120–21, and DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 26–
27 (2004).
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between news and entertainment increasingly blurs. Loony litigation
plays to popular prejudice and offers a diverting alternative to dreary
statistical details about the potential plaintiffs priced out of the justice
process. As a result, the public gets anecdotal glimpses of atypical
cases without a sense of their overall significance. A content analysis
of one widely publicized book, The Litigation Explosion, tallied up its
“evidence”: 272 short anecdotes, 1 case study, and 6 citations to
statistical surveys.25 Many of the statistical data were highly
26
misleading.
The problem is compounded by political polemics and businesssponsored media campaigns that take considerable poetic license. In
the 1992 presidential debates, then-President George H.W. Bush
maintained that Americans were “suing each other too much and
27
caring for each other too little.” His son continued the theme a
decade later in calling for tort reforms to curb “junk lawsuits” and the
“litigation culture.”28 Without apparent irony, a president who owed
his election to a lawsuit has lamented, “We’re a litigious society;
everybody is suing, it seems like. There are too many lawsuits in
America . . . .”29 Their effect, according to President George W. Bush,
is to “terrorize small business owners” and drive doctors out of
30
practice. And, he pointed out, “[N]o one has ever been healed by a
frivolous lawsuit.”31
Since 2001, the United States Chamber of Commerce alone has
spent over $100 million on television commercials and related

25. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 67 (discussing WALTER OLSEN, THE
LITIGATION EXPLOSION (1992)).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 46–90.
27. BURKE, supra note 3, at 171 (quoting President George H.W. Bush).
28. Nick Anderson & Edwin Chen, Bush Pushes Stance Against “Junk Lawsuits,” L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at A20 (quoting President George W. Bush); see Stephen Labaton, Bush’s
Calls for Tort Overhaul Face Action in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at A12 (quoting
President George W. Bush about the need “to protect honest job-creators from junk lawsuits”);
Warren Vieth, Bush Hammers Medical Malpractice Suits, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A17
(quoting President George W. Bush’s demand for national action against “junk lawsuits”);
President George W. Bush, Address at the University of Scranton, Penn. (Jan. 16, 2003),
available at 2003 WL 125455; see also Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary,
President
Calls
for
Medical
Liability Reform, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/01/print20030116.html (Jan. 16, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(summarizing President Bush’s remarks).
29. Bush, supra note 28.
30. RHODE, supra note 1, at 121 (quoting George W. Bush, then-Texas governor).
31. David Hechler, At ATLA, “We Are at War,” NAT’L L.J., Feb. 10, 2003, at A1 (quoting
President George W. Bush).
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32
strategies. The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA)
coordinates public relations and lobbying efforts by over three
hundred well-financed corporate and trade groups, along with thirty
state reform organizations.33 Advertising campaigns sponsored by
business and insurance interests offer variations on the same theme.
Some campaigns feature public parks and recreational facilities shut
down because of liability concerns; other television ads show vaccines
withdrawn from the market and pregnant women unable to find
maternity care. A bumper sticker accompanying one campaign reads:
“Go Ahead. Hit Me (I Need the Money).”34 The demons in these
morality plays are, of course, “fat cat” trial attorneys who are “living
35
in the ‘lap of luxury’ at the expense of taxpayers and consumers.”
The Manhattan Institute’s report, Trial Lawyers, Inc., and the
associated website chronicle the costs of excessive claims.36 Citizens
against Lawsuit Abuse, which has local organizations in about a half
dozen states, also has a website featuring “loony lawsuits” and
strategies for curbing them.37 Books sell widely with titles like The
38
Case against Lawyers and The Rule of Lawyers: How the New
Litigation Elite Threatens America’s Rule of Law.39 Their message is
simple: attorneys are “making out like bandits,” while bankrupting
businesses, clogging the courts, and pricing insurance out of reach for
millions of consumers.40
The bar responds in kind. The Association of Trial Lawyers of
America (ATLA) and its sister state organizations periodically launch
major advertising efforts to educate voters and juries about the “true”

32. Shailagh Murray, Trial-Lawyers Lobby Discovers Unlikely Friends: Republicans, WALL
ST. J., July 8, 2004, at A1.
33. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 43.
34. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact That It Has Had Is Between People’s
Ears:” Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 470 (2000).
35. Rhode, supra note 23, at 150.
36. The Manhattan Institute, Trial Lawyers Inc.com, at http://www.triallawyersinc.com.
37. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 45.
38. CATHERINE CRIER, THE CASE AGAINST LAWYERS (2002).
39. WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE
THREATENS AMERICA’S RULE OF LAW (2003).
40. See CRIER, supra note 38, at 187 (noting the monetary costs and drain on judicial
resources caused by “ridiculous suits”); AAHP Launches New Television Ad Campaign, PR
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 25, 1999 (“Laws that make trial lawyers rich by drowning the courts with new
lawsuits . . . could cost almost two million Americans their health insurance.”).
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41
villains and victims in personal injury litigation. In the world that bar
commercials portray, only attorneys stand between the ordinary
citizen and the “corporate wolves” at the door: swindlers, polluters,
and manufacturers of unsafe products.42 Recent public relations
efforts to halt malpractice reforms feature a disabled child in a
wheelchair who will never walk again “because of a careless medical
error.”43 In another advertisement, a woman recounts having both
breasts removed after a false diagnosis of breast cancer.44 “Who do
you trust to say what’s fair,” an unseen narrator asks rhetorically,
“the jury, or corporations and their politicians? Don’t let them put
profits over people.”45
In these warring public relations campaigns, truth is a frequent
casualty. The facts get dumbed down and spruced up to fit selfinterested agendas. “Whatever you do has to fit on a bumper sticker,”
explains one veteran ATLA lobbyist.46 Such sound bites distort the
reality that they claim to describe. As one tort expert notes:

Editorial writers, policy analysts, and legislators typically pick one of
these competing [accounts], pair it with a few highly salient (and
invariably unrepresentative) anecdotes, and then offer their
preferred policy initiative as the solution du jour. . . .
. . . Those involved in this series of kabuki-like performances
demonstrate little interest in determining which of these competing
47
realities is true . . . .

The result is that reform strategies are proceeding without an
informed understanding of procedural pathologies, their underlying
causes, and the complex tradeoffs that solutions will require.
The first difficulty is that critics’ accounts of legal hypochondria
prove neither that America has exceptional levels of frivolous claims

41. See Martin Lasden, On the Air, CAL. LAW., June 2003, at 12, 12 (describing a recent
ATLA advertising campaign).
42. See Rhode, supra note 23, at 151 (recalling one such ad by the Consumer Attorneys of
California).
43. Lasden, supra note 41, at 12.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Murray, supra note 32, at A6 (quoting Linda Lipsen).
47. David A. Hyman, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System: What Do We Know and
What (If Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1639, 1639–40 (2002).
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nor that they occupy a substantial amount of judicial time. Courts in
many cultures provide outlets for petty grievances and develop
strategies for sanctioning or summarily dismissing clearly meritless
cases.49
Moreover, what qualifies as a frivolous claim generally depends
on the eye of the beholder. Although some cases, including a number
of those described earlier, meet almost anyone’s definition, the line
between vindictiveness and vindication is often difficult to draw.
Sexual harassment lawsuits were once routinely dismissed as “petty
50
slights of the hypersensitive,” beneath judicial notice. Yet only
through these “petty” claims have Americans finally begun to
recognize the real price of such abuse in turnover, absenteeism,
psychological damages, unequal opportunities, and lost productivity.51
Many illustrations of trivial claims and outrageous verdicts also
rely on misleading factual accounts. A textbook example involves a
multimillion dollar punitive damages award against McDonald’s for
serving coffee at a scalding temperature.52 To most Americans, this
case served as an all-purpose indictment of the legal profession and
legal process. An avaricious lawyer paraded a petty incident before
an out-of-control jury and extracted an absurd recovery.53 Politicians,
pundits, and industry leaders replayed endless variations on the
theme summarized by the national Chamber of Commerce: “Is it fair
to get a couple of million dollars from a restaurant just because you
spilled your hot coffee on yourself?”54

48. The text accompanying notes 48–72 builds on earlier discussions in RHODE, supra note
1, at 121–23 and RHODE, supra note 24, at 28–29.
49. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4, 56 (1983).
50. DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX 98 (1997) (quoting trial judge’s
characterization).
51. KERRY SEGRAVE, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE, 1600
TO 1993, 203 (1994).
52. Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided That a Coffee Spill Is Worth
$2.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, l994, at A1. For my earlier account of the McDonald’s case,
see RHODE, supra note 24, at 28–29 and RHODE, supra note 1, at 122. For another, fuller
treatment, see HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 183–226.
53. See Gerlin, supra note 52 (“Public opinion is squarely on the side of McDonald’s. Polls
have shown a large majority of Americans . . . to be outraged at the verdict.”).
54. RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, NO CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE
PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 267 (1996). The McDonald’s case has figured
prominently in Congressional debates. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 279.
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On closer examination, the question no longer looks rhetorical.
The plaintiff, a 79-year-old woman, suffered acutely painful third55
degree burns from 180-degree coffee. She spent eight days in the
hospital and returned again for skin grafts.56 Only after McDonald’s
refused to reimburse her medical expenses did she bring suit.57 At
trial, jurors learned of seven hundred burn cases involving
58
McDonald’s coffee during the preceding decade. Although medical
experts had warned that such high temperatures were causing serious
injuries, the corporation’s safety consultant had viewed the number of
complaints as “trivial.”59 The jury’s verdict of $2.3 million was not an
arbitrary choice.60 Its punitive damages award represented two days of
coffee sales revenues. The judge then reduced the judgment to
61
$640,000. To avoid an appeal, the plaintiff settled the case for a
lesser, undisclosed amount.62 McDonald’s put up warning signs and
63
other fast-food chains adopted similar measures. Although
evaluations of this final result may vary, it was not the patently
“ridiculous” travesty that critics described.64 The same is true of the
approximately two dozen coffee spill cases that have gone to trial in
the decade following the original verdict. Outcomes for plaintiffs have
differed, but consumers as a group have benefited from tighter lids
65
and other safety innovations.
The skewed spin given to the McDonald’s litigation is not an
isolated case. Examples of litigiousness that are deficient in drama
66
sometimes “have drama grafted on.” All too often, facts fall by the
wayside to make a better story, and the public misses what the real

55. NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 268–69.
56. Id. at 268.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 269.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 271.
61. See id. (noting the basis of the jury award); Cindy Webb, Boiling Mad, BUS. WK., Aug.
21, 1995, at 32, 32 (noting the reduction of the judgment).
62. NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 272.
63. Webb, supra note 61, at 32.
64. See NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 267 (quoting the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s
characterization of the award as “ridiculous”). But see S. Reed Morgan, Letter to the Editor,
Verdict Against McDonald’s Is Fully Justified, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 24, 1994, at A20 (explaining the
justification for the verdict).
65. Matt Fleischer-Black, One Lump or Two, AM. LAW., June 2004, at 15, 15.
66. See DAVID L. PALETZ & ROBERT M. ENTMAN, MEDIA, POWER, POLITICS 16 (1981)
(“Drama is a defining characteristic of news.”).
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story should be. When unrepresentative anecdotes substitute for
67
analysis, they camouflage broader trends. Stories are easier to sell
than statistics, so descriptions of what the ATRA terms “lawsuit
68
abuse” are frequently long on folklore and short on facts. The
problem is compounded by cognitive biases. Because vivid incidents
are consistently repeated and readily recalled, the public tends to
overestimate how often they occur.69 Drama displaces data, and
Americans end up with a misdiagnosis of both the problem and the
prescription.
A case in point is the perennially popular assertion that the
United States is experiencing an escalating epidemic of litigation and
70
has become “the world’s most litigious nation.” Scholars have
debunked this claim so often that it is startling how much bunk
survives. Current litigation rates in the United States are not
exceptionally high, in comparison either with prior eras or with many
other Western industrial nations not known for contentiousness.
Americans were more likely to sue a century ago than they are now.71
United States court filings now are in the same range, when adjusted
for population, as those in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, England,
and Denmark.72 According to Professor Marc Galanter’s recent study,

67. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1161 (1992).
68. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 135 (noting ATRA criticisms); see also HALTOM &
MCCANN, supra note 24, at 1–13, 66–67 (describing distorted accounts); Lynn A. Baker &
Charles Silver, Civil Justice Fact and Fiction, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1537, 1538–42 (2002)
(documenting misconceptions and false anecdotes); Richard Lacayo, Anecdotes Not Antidotes,
TIME, Apr. 10, 1995, at 40, 40 (critiquing a commentator’s use of anecdotes); Jonathan Turley,
Legal Myths: Hardly the Whole Truth, USA TODAY, Jan. 31, 2005, at 11A (citing fabricated
accounts).
69. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 69, 153; Saks, supra note 67, at 1161.
70. John Leo, The World’s Most Litigious Nation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 22,
1995, at 24, 24; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 16–17 (characterizing litigation as a
“national disease”); Stephen Budiansky et al., How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Jan. 30, 1995, at 50, 50 (discussing a perceived “litigation explosion”). The
discussion of litigation rates in the text accompanying notes 70–90 tracks RHODE, supra note 24,
at 29–31 and RHODE, supra note 1, at 123–24.
71. Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1103
(1996); Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81
TEX. L. REV. 285, 285–86 (2002).
72. RHODE, supra note 1, at 123; Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in
Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1981–82
(2002); cf. Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV.
U. L. REV. 77, 80 (1993) (observing that the numbers of lawyers in England, Canada, and
Germany increased at comparable or higher rates during the last generation).
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“The Vanishing Trial,” the number of federal and state courtroom
contests peaked in the mid-1980s and has dramatically declined ever
73
since. It is true that Americans resort to litigation more often than
other nations to solve social problems.74 But whether or when this is
undesirable is far more complicated than critics generally assume.
The relevant question should be, “Compared to what?”
In any event, litigation rates are no measure of abusive litigation.
Uncontested divorces account for much of the recent growth in civil
caseloads. Yet the higher frequency of marital breakdowns appears
less a reflection of increased litigiousness than of increased
expectations for marital satisfaction and decreased tolerance of
75
domestic violence. Nor do such cases constitute a major drain on
judicial resources: one representative survey clocked the average
76
uncontested divorce hearing at four minutes. Although business
leaders are the sharpest critics of litigiousness, disputes between
businesses are the largest and fastest growing category of civil cases.
Tort claims, such as those involving personal injuries and defective
products, trigger the most criticism but are in fact declining.77
Improvements in product safety, increased use of alternative dispute
resolution, and tort reforms that make lawsuits less profitable have all
played a role in curbing litigation.78
What are rising, however, are the size of tort awards and
malpractice premiums, and these increases prompt substantial
concern. For example, in product liability litigation, the median
award, not including punitive damages, has tripled over the last

73. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 459 (2004) (tracing the
decline in the portion of cases that terminate in trials); Tyler Cunningham, Disappearing Act,
S.F. DAILY J., June 1, 2004, at A1 (“Although the number of lawsuits filed has generally
increased over [the past four decades], fewer of them end in the courtroom drama commonly
thought to be law’s main event.”).
74. BURKE, supra note 3, at 4; cf. MICHAEL H. TROTTER, PROFIT AND THE PRACTICE OF
LAW 167 (1997) (noting the rapid increase in rates of case filings in the United States since the
early 1980s).
75. RHODE, supra note 1, at 123.
76. Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah L. Rhode, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro
Se Divorce, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 129 (1976).
77. Greg Winter, Jury Awards Soar As Lawsuits Decline on Defective Goods, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2001, at A1.
78. Ted Rohrlich, We Aren’t Seeing You in Court, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at A1; see also
Galanter, supra note 72, at 92–95 (noting the decrease in products liability suits filed).
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79

decade. Medical malpractice recoveries have grown as well, although
at more modest rates.80 Malpractice premiums in some regions and
some specialties also have risen dramatically; in 2002 alone, some
81
doctors paid increases between 40 and 112 percent. It is, however,
unlikely that the average increases result from abusive litigation or
runaway jury verdicts. Indeed, the most commonly cited reasons for
the growing size of awards are that medical costs have increased at
about the same rate as recoveries and that plaintiffs’ lawyers are more
selective in the litigation that they bring; only cases with reasonably
strong evidence of liability and substantial damages are worth
litigating.82 Punitive damages, the most common target of critics, are
83
awarded in only about 4 percent of cases that plaintiffs win in court,
and only about 2 percent of malpractice claims result in victories at
trial.84 Contrary to common wisdom, juries are no more likely than
judges to show sympathy for injured victims and to award punitive
85
damages.
So, too, the average increase in malpractice premiums is not
exceptional in relation to health care costs and reflects a number of
factors that bear no relation to the merits of suits filed. First, the
average increase in doctors’ premiums over the last quarter century
has been between 11 and 12 percent, which is about the same as
recent increases in health insurance premiums for individual
86
consumers and their employers. Moreover, according to most
commentators, the spikes in costs for physicians in some areas are

79. Winter, supra note 77. But see Jonathan D. Glater, Study of Size of Jury Awards Finds
a Flattening Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2005, at C2 (noting that both the total and the median
of the largest jury awards have declined from 2002 to 2004).
80. Peter Eisler et al., Hype Outraces Facts in Malpractice Debate, USA TODAY, Mar. 5,
2003, at 1A. Not all regions show substantial growth. See Bernard Black et al., False Diagnosis,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A25 (citing findings that large Texas malpractice awards between
1988 and 2002, when adjusted for inflation, showed no significant increase).
81. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 28.
82. See Eisler et al., supra note 80 (“Medical costs are going up . . . and they tend to drive
up medical malpractice awards . . . .”); Joseph B. Treaster, Malpractice Insurance: No Clear or
Easy Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2003, at C1 (noting lawyers’ reluctance to take weak cases
with low award potential); Winter, supra note 77 (“Smaller cases are getting priced out of the
market . . . .”).
83. William Glaberson, A Study’s Verdict: Jury Awards Are Not Out of Control, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A9.
84. Eisler et al., supra note 80.
85. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 779 (2002).
86. Eisler et al., supra note 80.
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largely attributable to factors other than litigation: poor investment
revenues for insurance companies; the loss of a few major providers;
and the need to compensate for price wars in the 1990s, when greater
87
competition kept premiums low. How much effect large damage
awards have on policy costs is subject to debate,88 but most evidence
suggests that caps on awards are not the best way of controlling
89
malpractice policy costs. States such as California that have curtailed
such costs have done so by regulating the insurance industry, not by
90
limiting lawsuit recoveries. That is not to deny the hardships
resulting from premium increases, nor to discount other problems in
the tort system. But it is to suggest that the nature and causes of those
problems are rather different from what conventional wisdom
assumes.
II. REDEFINING THE PROBLEM:
INEFFICIENCY, INCONSISTENCY, AND INEQUITY
Although excessive litigation is the pathology dominating public
discussion and policy agendas, systematic research reveals that the
more serious problems are undercompensation of victims and
overcompensation of lawyers. For example, the most systematic
research finds that only about 10 percent of accident victims file

87. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Bush Enters Fray over Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at
A1; see also Black et al., supra note 80 (citing evidence that the increase in Texas malpractice
premiums reflects forces outside the tort system); Laura Bradford, Out of Medicine, TIME, Sept.
16, 2002, at A13, A13 (attributing the rising costs of malpractice insurance to the fact that some
insurers raised premiums to compensate for decreased investment and others “pulled out of the
malpractice market completely”); Eisler et al., supra note 80 (suggesting that insurance
companies raised medical malpractice premiums to compensate for the price wars of the 1990s);
Jyoti Thottam, He Sets Your Doctor’s Bill, TIME, June 9, 2003, at 50, 50 (“Industry analysts say
insurers’ investment losses, not just jury awards, are behind the crisis [in medical malpractice
insurance costs].”).
88. For discussion of the relationship between caps and premiums, see Kenneth E. Thorpe,
The Medical Malpractice “Crisis”: Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH
TRACKING, Jan. 21, 2004, at W4-20, W4-25 to W4-27; Eisler et al., supra, note 80; Richard
Perez-Pena, Few Doctors at Protests on Insurance in New York, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2003, at
B5; Treaster, supra note 82.
89. Eisler et al., supra note 80. Moreover, it is also unclear that caps on noneconomic
damages effectively limit the defendants overall liability. Adam Liptak, Go Ahead. Test a
Lawyer’s Ingenuity. Try to Limit Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at E5 (discussing a study
of jury verdicts finding that the amounts were roughly comparable in states with and without
caps).
90. See Treaster, supra note 82 (observing that California’s price controls, adopted in 1988,
had the greatest and most consistent effect on lowering malpractice insurance premiums).
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91
claims and only 2 percent bring lawsuits. Similarly, a review of some
thirty thousand New York hospital records discloses that only about
12 percent of patients who sustained injuries from negligent medical
care brought malpractice actions and only half of those patients
received compensation.92 Other research on medical malpractice cases
finds that plaintiffs on average recover just over half of their costs,
and those claimants with the most severe injuries end up with only a
fourth of their costs.93 Similar patterns of undercompensation hold for
94
victims of unsafe products or automobile and airline accidents. The
tort liability system reimburses only about 4 percent of victims’ direct
losses from accidental injuries.95
Part of the reason for this undercompensation lies in the highly
expensive adversarial system on which Americans rely to compensate
most injuries. This nation turns to courts for needs that other
countries meet through less costly administrative measures and social
services.96 For example, accident victims in many Western
industrialized societies can seek assistance from agency-run
compensation structures, guaranteed health insurance, or no-fault
wage replacement systems, rather than from personal injury litigation.
Litigation American style is too expensive for claims involving
modest economic damages and medical costs. Recent tort reforms
capping pain and suffering awards have made lawsuits even less
feasible for the vast majority of injuries.97 Cases worth less than
$150,000 are typically priced out of the court system.98

91. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 121–26 (1991); see also PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL
JUSTICE: THE DILEMMAS OF TORT LAW 58 (1997) (referring to Hensler’s finding, supra, that “a
very small percentage of injured persons—in the neighborhood of 10 percent—make any kind
of claim for compensation from an injuring party or his insurer”); Marc Galanter, The
Conniving Claimant: Changing Images of Misuse of Legal Remedies, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 647,
663 (2000) (noting a study finding that 10 percent of potential claimants made claims); Saks,
supra note 67, at 1183–87 (reviewing results of various studies of tort claimants’ behavior).
92. HARVARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 2, 6 (1990).
93. Frank A. Sloan & Stephen S. van Wert, Cost and Compensation of Injuries in Medical
Malpractice, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 155 (Winter 1991).
94. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 91, at 121–28; HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 98.
95. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 140; HENSLER ET AL., supra note 91, at 121–28.
96. See BURKE, supra note 3, at 3–4 (discussing “America’s uniquely litigious public policy
style”); KAGAN, supra note 17, at 135–37 (discussing the Japanese system, which focuses on
nonlitigious dispute resolution).
97. See Jamie Court, Commentary, Damage Cap Adds Insult to Injuries, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2003, at B11 (“[I]nnocent patients who cannot prove large wage loss or medical bills . . .
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The expense of legal proceedings is not, of course, lost on the
public. Over four-fifths of surveyed Americans believe that litigation
is too slow and too costly, and about three-quarters believe that it is
99
damaging the country’s economy. About half of surveyed corporate
leaders think that product liability suits have a major impact on their
100
companies’ international competitiveness. Yet, although concerns
about expense are eminently justifiable, fears about economic
productivity are less well grounded. Precise cost assessments are
lacking, but the most systematic research estimates that tort liability
could represent no more than 2 percent of the total expense of United
States goods and services, an amount highly unlikely to have a
substantial effect on American competitiveness.101 Other estimates
suggest that businesses’ total liability for all legal claims, including
torts, is about twenty-five cents for every one hundred dollars in
revenue.102 Given such modest costs, it is not surprising that corporate
risk managers have reported relatively little adverse effect from
liability on larger economic indicators such as gross revenues or
market share. In managers’ experience, the major impact of tort
claims has been to improve product safety and warning efforts.103
A related concern about the expense of litigation is that undue
risks of liability and excessive insurance premiums cause businesses to
refrain from distributing valuable products and force doctors to shift
104
or order
their practice locations, change their specialties,

often cannot find attorneys because the economics do not add up for lawyers . . . .”); infra text
accompanying note 183.
98. Court, supra note 97.
99. See Karen O’Connor, Civil Justice Reform and Prospects for Change, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 917, 922 (1993) (noting the results of a study on attitudes toward the speed and cost of
litigation); Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1 (noting
poll results on the effect of litigation on the national economy).
100. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 147.
101. Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths and
Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 127, 128–29 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
102. NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 279.
103. NATHAN WEBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CORPORATE RESPONSE 2 (Conf. Bd.,
Rep. No. 893, 1987).
104. For reports that excessive premiums are driving doctors in some states out of business,
causing them to abandon high-risk specialty procedures or forcing them to move states with
more favorable tort laws, see Daniel Eisenberg & Maggie Sieger, The Doctor Won’t See You
Now, TIME, June 9, 2003, at 46, 46; Eisler et al., supra note 80; Ten-Gallon Tort Reform, WALL
ST. J., June 6, 2003, at A10.
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105
unnecessary medical tests. Critics claim that Americans are guided
less by the rule of law than by “the fear of law.”106 Here again, some
concern is warranted but the extent of the problem often is
overstated. The exodus of doctors appears confined to a few
geographic areas and a few fields such as obstetrics.107 On average,
only about 3 percent of doctors’ revenue covers malpractice
108
premiums, an amount not self-evidently excessive or likely to cause
major career changes. Most research has not found a systematic
relationship between insurance premium increases and withdrawals
from practice.109 Studies of “defensive medicine” suggest that liability
risks have led to both desirable and excessive precautions.110 Whether
the costs are justified involves complex value tradeoffs that popular
debate generally ignores or obscures. A review by the federal
government’s Office of Technology Assessment concludes that “a
relatively small proportion of all diagnostic procedures—certainly less
than 8 percent overall—is performed primarily due to conscious
concern about malpractice liability risk.”111 Many experts also believe
that the frequency of unnecessary procedures has been declining still
112
further as a result of cost constraints imposed by managed care.
Although product withdrawals sometimes have been a major
113
problem, as in the case of vaccines for childhood illnesses, in other
instances litigation has reduced major safety risks. Obvious examples

105. See HOWARD, supra note 4, at 25 (“‘We know we don’t need [X rays],’ one doctor
admitted, ‘but you have to prove it in court.’” (alteration in original)).
106. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Welcome to Sue City, U.S.A., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 16, 2003, at 64, 64.
107. See Eisler et al., supra note 80 (“[D]octors in particularly vulnerable specialties—
obstetrics, neurosurgery and some high-risk surgical fields—face severe problems . . . .”).
108. Id.
109. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 74 (1994) (observing that two studies found no “statistically significant positive
relationship between liability risk and withdrawal from obstetrics practice”); Eisler et al., supra
note 80 (“[T]here is little statistical evidence that more than a tiny percentage of doctors
nationwide are making such decisions [to leave practice because of rising premiums].”).
110. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 274 n.28; see also BELL & O’CONNELL, supra note 91, at 92
(noting both beneficial and “wasteful” effects of defensive medicine); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality
in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 402
(1994) (“[T]he practice changes induced by the malpractice system include a substantial
measure of both [appropriate and inappropriate defensive medicine].”).
111. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 109, at 74.
112. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1607 (2002).
113. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 143 (noting the withdrawal of some childhood vaccine
manufacturers from the market).

RHODE FINAL.DOC

6/6/2005 10:37 AM

2004] FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION AND CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM

463

include asbestos, flammable pajamas, Dalkon Shields, and products
114
causing toxic shock syndrome.
Exaggerated portraits of litigation expenses also compound the
problem that critics describe. Systematic overestimation of liability
costs encourages unnecessary tests and product removals.115 And
media coverage that disproportionately focuses on huge damages
awards encourages such skewed perceptions.116 Cases reported by the
press have verdicts between four and thirty-four times larger than the
117
average. Many of these large verdicts are reversed or settled for
lesser amounts. One study of malpractice cases found that almost half
118
were reduced after the verdict. Other research on punitive damages
has found that three-fifths of the jury awards are not fully paid.119 Yet
because the news needs to be new, exceptional awards attract
disproportionate coverage. Such awards are easier for reporters to
identify, because plaintiffs’ lawyers have an obvious interest in
publicizing large victories rather than humiliating losses or modest
settlements. Confidentiality agreements also prevent disclosure of
many final outcomes.120 Moreover, cases involving exceptional
recoveries or frivolous claims often are especially memorable.121 The
combined effect of selective reporting and selective recall leads to
misperceptions of the likelihood of large recoveries, particularly in
tort contexts.122 Even relatively well-informed individuals—including
114. NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 315–17 (listing cases in which tort liability led to
significant safety improvements, including in tampons and flammable pajamas); Schwartz, supra
note 110, at 406 (discussing the Dalkon Shield).
115. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 17, at 142–43 (citing examples of unnecessary deterrence).
116. Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the Civil Jury, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE
CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 61, 85 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
117. Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as
Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
419, 426 (1996); see also HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 166, 167 tbl.4 (“[M]ore than
nine out of ten reported settlements and about seven out of ten reported awards surpass [the
estimated medians of settlement and award amounts].”).
118. Joseph T. Hallinan, In Malpractice Trials, Juries Rarely Have the Last Word, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 30, 2004, at A1 (referring to a study by Professor Neil Vidmar).
119. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 99.
120. Id. at 129–31.
121. See William Glaberson, The $2.9 Million Cup of Coffee: When the Verdict Is Just a
Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1999, at D1 (“Unusual or big verdicts make news . . . .”).
122. For discussion of the psychological tendency of individuals to overestimate the
frequency of a given type of occurrence based on their recall of examples of that occurrence,
regardless of its actual statistical likelihood, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207,
208 (1973); see also HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 153 (“Newspapers report the
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lawyers, legislators, and insurance adjusters—have highly inflated
perceptions of both the frequency of litigation and the size and
123
likelihood of plaintiffs’ verdicts.
Research on the litigation system reveals significant problems
but they are not the ones highlighted in popular debate and policy
agendas. The most well-documented concerns involve inefficiency
124
and inconsistency. Litigation is an extremely expensive way to
compensate victims. Plaintiffs’ attorneys collect an estimated $30
125
billion annually in legal fees —money that could otherwise help
prevent or compensate injuries. In cases of automobile accidents,
almost 50 percent of the payments by insurance companies end up in
the hands of lawyers for both sides rather than in the pockets of
victims.126 In other tort cases, the transaction costs are even higher,
127
averaging close to 60 percent. And in mass tort litigation involving
asbestos, two-thirds of insurance expenditures have gone to lawyers
and experts.128 Such costs are not inevitable. Other countries do better
by relying more heavily on official investigations and nonlitigious
129
dispute resolution procedures to resolve accident claims. In Japan,
for example, experts estimate that legal fees consume only about 2
130
percent of compensation payments. Few victims find it necessary
131
even to hire lawyers.
The Netherlands’ no-fault system for

spinning of tort reformers and, having thereby made tort tales widely available, cite that very
availability as evidence of frequency.”).
123. Galanter, supra note 116, at 85–86; see also Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South
Carolina: The Effect of Empirical Research on Elite Perceptions Concerning Jury Verdicts, 39
S.C. L. REV. 585, 594–98 (1988) (describing a study finding that doctors, lawyers, and legislators
significantly overestimated trends in civil litigation and jury awards); Glaberson, supra note 121
(describing policymakers’ reliance on exaggerated impressions of the tort system).
124. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 126–27 (commenting on the inefficiency and
inconsistency of American asbestos litigation).
125. Pamela Sherrid, Lawyers on Trial, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 2001, at 34, 34.
126. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION 29 (1987) (finding
that plaintiffs in automobile-related cases received 52 percent of total payouts); see also Charles
Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2099–100 (2002) (discussing
the Hensler study’s findings, supra).
127. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 126, at 29 (finding that plaintiffs in non-automobilerelated cases received 43 percent of total payouts).
128. See id. (finding that plaintiffs in asbestos-related cases received 37 percent of total
payouts).
129. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 136–37 (describing Japanese procedures).
130. Id. at 137; Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident
Compensation in Japan, 24 LAW & SOC. REV. 651, 663–64 (1990).
131. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 137 (citing data showing that fewer than 2 percent of
Japanese accident victims hire lawyers).
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reimbursing asbestos victims similarly manages to avoid the excessive
132
transaction costs of American litigation. These systems may, of
133
course, create other problems of undercompensation. But as noted
above, undercompensation is also common in the American justice
system, which prices out modest claims entirely and imposes excessive
transaction costs on the ones that remain.134
The problems are compounded in class action cases in which the
real parties in interest are the lawyers. In some cases, class members’
injuries are de minimis, but the costs of trial are sufficient to lead to
settlements that provide generous counsel fees for plaintiffs’
135
attorneys and little or no compensation for clients. Defendants find
such settlements particularly inviting if the remedy can be structured
so that most plaintiffs will not claim the damages to which they are
theoretically entitled. The most notorious example is the coupon
settlement, in which prevailing parties receive a discount against
future purchases of the defendants’ products.136 Often, the amounts
are too trivial to justify efforts to collect them. In one all too typical
case, only two of 96,754 coupons were ever redeemed, a rate of .002
percent.137 In other cases involving big-ticket items like cars or trucks,
few plaintiffs are likely to make another purchase within the
138
redemption period. Because attorneys’ fees for prevailing parties
are generally based on the damages officially awarded, not those
actually redeemed, lawyers may be well compensated by coupon
settlements that are little more than sales promotions for defendants’
products.139
Such strategies received the treatment that they deserved in
columnist Dave Barry’s account of the “Adhesive Denture

132. See id. at 126–27 (comparing the relative costs of the Dutch and American systems).
133. See id. at 126 (describing compensation under the Dutch system as “modest”).
134. See BURKE, supra note 3, at 194 (discussing transaction costs); KAGAN, supra note 17,
at 126–27 (discussing undercompensation in the asbestos context); supra text accompanying
note 98.
135. See CRIER, supra note 38, at 194 (observing that, in a settlement of a suit against
Blockbuster Video, “[c]lass members [got] a free rental, but the attorneys rake[d] in a bundle”).
136. See Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class
Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 473 (1996) (describing coupon
settlement procedures).
137. CRIER, supra note 38, at 194.
138. Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 136, at 502.
139. See NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 195 (quoting the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit’s rejection of the GM coupon settlement as “arguably . . . a GM sales promotion
device”).
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140
Menace.” This national peril arose after a manufacturer recalled
certain adhesives containing traces of benzene, a potential
141
Without evidence of any actual injuries, vigilant
carcinogen.
attorneys brought suit on behalf of purchasers unaware of their
“victimhood.”142 The settlement gave several hundred known buyers
seven dollars and gave some 2,800 undocumented buyers the
opportunity to fill out forms and receive a package of discount
coupons.143 Lawyers’ fees and expenses totaled almost $1 million.144 As
Barry acknowledges, this may seem like “[a] lot of money . . . [but i]t
cannot be easy, taking a case wherein it appears, to the naked
untrained layperson eye, that nobody has suffered any observable
harm, and, using legal skills, turning it into a financial transaction that
involves thousands of people and a million dollars! Plus coupons!”145
However, the value of these cases cannot be measured solely in
economic terms. Their function is also deterrence. Class actions serve
to discourage misconduct when none of the injured parties suffers
large enough individual damages to justify legal challenge. Generous
awards in successful cases also help compensate attorneys for cases
that are unsuccessful. The same is true of tort litigation more
generally. Some plaintiffs’ lawyers incur large risks in subsidizing
146
lawsuits that serve crucial public interests. Often, an entrepreneurial
plaintiffs’ bar has ensured accountability for hazardous products,
fraudulent practices, discriminatory conduct, and other violations of
legal rights. Litigation has stepped in where politicians and
government regulators have feared to tread, and Americans have a
safer and more just society as a consequence. Moreover, many
plaintiffs’ attorneys do not earn excessive returns for bringing such
actions. Outside the large metropolitan areas where high-stakes
litigation centers, the average earnings of contingent fee attorneys

140. Dave Barry, Lawyers Put the Bite on Denture-Adhesive Maker, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Nov. 23, 1993, at E1.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. The most obvious recent example is the tobacco cases. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra
note 24, at 258–59. For discussion of excessive claims by tobacco lawyers, see Alex Beam, Greed
on Trial, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2004, at 96.
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may not be significantly greater than those of counsel who bill
147
hourly.
Yet, although the problem of excessive fees is frequently
overstated, it clearly needs addressing. In too many cases, windfall
recoveries for lawyers far exceed reasonable returns, or the incentives
necessary to bring socially useful lawsuits.148 The cost of such
excessive fees does not fall only on businesses with deep pockets. The
result may be an increase in prices for consumers or a reduction in the
funds available for compensating seriously injured plaintiffs. The
American Lawyer magazine had it right in a story about one class
action attorney who represented some eighty thousand clients with
the same basic claims for leaky plumbing.149 Despite the relatively
minimal work required, he sought over $100 million in fees and
150
expenses, totaling about two-thirds of the class settlement fund. The
151
story’s headline came to the point: “Greedy, Greedy, Greedy.”
Not only is the American adversary system excessively
152
The most
expensive, it is also inaccurate and inconsistent.
systematic studies of medical malpractice cases have found that most
victims of substandard care did not file claims or recover any
compensation, but that more than 80 percent of those who did bring
suit did not receive deficient care.153 Almost half of these medical

147. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 302 (1998) (summarizing study results indicating that
contingency-fee practice produces “at best ‘somewhat’ better” returns for lawyers, especially in
light of the time and effort required to screen cases and the inability of most contingency-fee
lawyers to “tap into” high-profit cases routinely). But see Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly
Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U.
L.Q. 653, 686, 734 (2003) (arguing that contingent-fee lawyers have far higher effective hourly
rates in tort litigation); Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort
Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 69 (2003) (“[A] top tier consisting
of approximately 25 to 30 percent of the torts bar is able to obtain effective rates of return of
thousand of dollars an hour; when these fees are obtained in cases where the lawyer has
undertaken no meaningful risk, they are properly referred to as windfall fees.”).
148. LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENT FEES 20–23 (1994); Brickman,
The Market for Contingent-Fee Financed Tort Litigation, supra note 147; see Beam, supra note
146, at 96–98, 105–108.
149. Alison Frankel, Greedy, Greedy, Greedy, AM. LAW., Nov. 1996, at 71, 71.
150. Id. at 72.
151. Id. at 71.
152. See Joseph Sanders, Adversarial Legalism and Civil Litigation: Prospects for Change, 28
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 719 (2003) (reviewing KAGAN, supra note 17) (outlining the “costliness”
and “legal uncertainty” of the American system of “adversarial legalism”).
153. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 140; Peter Huber, Easy Lawsuits Make Bad Medicine,
FORBES, Apr. 21, 1997, at 166, 166.
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malpractice plaintiffs nonetheless recovered damages because the
expenses of trial and risks of a large verdict made modest settlements
154
an attractive alternative for insurers. Other research on personal
injury claims reveals high levels of fraud, which is estimated to cost
insurance companies between $80 billion and $120 billion annually.155
In the tort cases that go to trial, results are often idiosyncratic
and poorly related to the extent of plaintiffs’ injuries and defendants’
culpability.156 What matters more is which side has the most effective
lawyers, whether the case is filed in a “plaintiff-friendly” region,157 and
whether defendants appear to have deep pockets.158 For example, in
one study of two decades of Chicago jury awards, plaintiffs who fell in
buildings owned by corporations recovered significantly higher
damages than plaintiffs who fell on government property, and three
159
times as much as plaintiffs who fell in private residences. In mass
tort cases, much depends on when the party’s injury is discovered and
how quickly the claim proceeds. Many asbestos victims with serious
injuries will recover less than victims with minor claims because, by
the time those injuries develop, most defendants will be bankrupt and
their assets largely exhausted.160 Other factors also contribute to the
154. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 140 (observing that expense and uncertainty in litigation
often pressure insurers to settle); Mello & Brennan, supra note 112, at 1619 (noting that sixteen
of thirty-seven surveyed claims were paid even though none of the claims was found to have
involved negligence).
155. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 146 (citing studies of high fraud rates); Silver, supra note
126, at 2076 (citing figures of insurance loss from fraud).
156. See BURKE, supra note 3; KAGAN, supra note 17, at 138–42; Daphne Eviatar, Is
Litigation a Blight, or Built In?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2002, at B7 (paraphrasing Professor
Thomas F. Burke’s view that “the system is far from equitable or predictable”).
157. See OLSON, supra note 39, at 209–36 (using various examples to describe the Deep
South as the “Jackpot Belt”); Jim Copland, The Tort Tax, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2003, at A16
(discussing the phenomenon of “magnet courts” or “magic jurisdictions” for class action suits);
Adam Liptak, Playing the Angles in Class-Action Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at C11
(reporting on a class action suit against Intel filed in Madison County, Illinois, the county with
the most class action filings per capita nationwide); Ten-Gallon Tort Reform, supra note 104
(praising tort reform legislation in Texas and noting that the state had previously been described
as a “judicial hellhole[] . . . correctly perceived as [a] very plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction[]”).
158. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2105 (1998) (“[E]quivalent outrage and punitive intent
will produce significantly higher dollar awards against wealthy defendants.”).
159. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 140.
160. See Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Anchem and
Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 1924 (2002) (“[T]he very sickest must give up some of the
compensation that might otherwise be theirs in order to satisfy the least sick (and their lawyers).
Moreover, those who discover that they are seriously injured some years hence may find very
little money left on the table.”); Adam Liptak, Shot in the Arm for Tort Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES,
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inconsistency in treatment of similar cases, such as the vagueness of
criteria for determining pain and suffering awards and punitive
damages, and jurors’ lack of information or experience concerning
161
the recoveries for similar claims in other cases. Many studies find a
poor correlation between juries’ and experts’ evaluations of the same
claims. Although, as noted earlier, most serious injuries are
undercompensated, a few plaintiffs hit the jackpot. Awards like the
$28 billion verdict for a single smoker in a tobacco case add a level of
uncertainty that works against rational settlement behavior and
consistent outcomes.162
Defenders of the tort system, typically the lawyers who are its
most frequent beneficiaries, claim that any inefficiencies are
outweighed by the deterrence functions that a fault-based system
ensures. Yet as experts readily acknowledge, there is little systematic
evidence about how much deterrence such a system adds to
regulatory controls, and whether the marginal deterrence is worth its
163
price. Most research suggests that the deterrent effect of tort cases is
muted by liability insurance and by the delays, inconsistencies, and
inaccuracies of litigation.164 For example, studies of medical
malpractice find that the chance that a physician’s negligent error will
165
lead to compensation is under 5 percent. And because doctors’
malpractice premiums generally do not reflect their personal records,
the economic sanctions imposed by current liability structures are
often indirect and ineffectual.166 Physicians already have strong
personal and professional reasons to avoid negligent practices, and it
is not clear that an expensive fault-based compensation system adds

Nov. 17, 2002, at C1 (noting the “finite sums of money available” to compensate asbestos
claimants).
161. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 138.
162. John M. Broder, California Jury Allots Damages of $28 Billion to Ill Smoker, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2002, at A14. An appellate court reduced the judgment to $28 million. Myron
Levin, Judge Slashes Huge Award in Smoking Case; Record $28-Billion Verdict by a Los Angeles
Jury to a Lung Cancer Sufferer is Trimmed to $28 Million, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, § 3 at 1.
163. See Schwartz, supra note 110, at 444 (“[F]or most sectors of tort law the pertinent data
bearing on safety benefits and defendant compliance costs are now and are likely to remain
unavailable. For this and other reasons, most sectors of tort law cannot be subjected to anything
resembling a full cost-benefit review.”).
164. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 141–44 (surveying research on the uncertain deterrent
effect of tort liability).
165. Mello & Brennan, supra note 112, at 1618.
166. See id. at 1621 (“[M]alpractice insurance premiums are rarely experience rated.
Thus, . . . health care providers do not feel the full economic consequences of their mistakes.”).

RHODE FINAL.DOC

470

6/6/2005 10:37 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:447

167
any crucial measure of deterrence. Other research on tort litigation
finds that the threat of lawsuits exerts a significant but vague
168
influence on individual and organizational behavior. As experts
note, “Because the linkage between good design and a firm’s liability
exposure remains tenuous, the signal says only: ‘Be careful, or you
will be sued.’ Unfortunately, it does not say how to be careful, or,
more important, how careful to be.”169
Moreover, the strengths of the American legal structure in
compensating for political inaction carry countervailing costs. Many
problems that land in courts by default could be addressed more
effectively by legislative or regulatory action. Particularly in cases
involving major societal interests or mass torts, delegating
decisionmaking to the least accountable branch of government raises
170
as many problems as it resolves. The tobacco litigation is a stunning
example of the inordinate health and legal costs that have resulted
from political paralysis. At last count, trial lawyers were set to pocket
more than $75 billion over the next quarter-century; some of these
lawyers netted fees amounting to $150,000 per hour.171 Much of that
money could have gone for prevention and treatment if the
government had acted earlier.
In short, America’s heavy reliance on litigation, particularly in
personal injury contexts, comes at a substantial price, although the
major problems are not the ones that dominate public debate.
American rates of litigation are neither as exceptional nor as great a
drain on productivity as critics often suggest. But the system for
compensating victims is inefficient, inconsistent, and inequitable.
Plaintiffs with serious injuries are undercompensated, similar cases do
not receive similar treatment, defendants draw murky or misleading
messages about the risks of liability, and the costs of dispute
resolution are excessive. These are not new concerns. To understand
their persistence, Americans need a more informed picture of the

167. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 141 (“The precautions taken by physicians . . . are
motivated primarily by professional ethics.”).
168. Id.
169. George Eads & Peter Reuter, Designing Safer Products: Corporate Responses to
Product Liability Law and Regulation, 7 J. PROD. LIAB. 263, 290 (1984).
170. See Robert J. Samuelson, Delegating Democracy, NEWSWEEK, June 12, 2000, at 59, 59
(suggesting that issues such as tobacco regulation and gun control should be resolved through
popular debate and legislation rather than through “[g]overnment by litigation”).
171. Marcia Coyle, Bill Targets Class Action Lawyer Fees: Sparked by Ire over Tobacco
Money, NAT’L L.J., May 19, 2003, at 1.
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underlying causes of the problems and the complexities of crafting
solutions.
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174
obtained large damages awards with no legal expenses. Similar
coalitions are now challenging other industries, such as gun and lead
175
paint manufacturers.
A full evaluation of alternative structures and potential reform
strategies is beyond the scope of this essay. But to put the debate over
access to justice in perspective, it makes sense at least to suggest
better ways of thinking about litigation-related problems and
appropriate policy responses. To this end, reform efforts should first
focus on core principles. What are the major goals of the justice
system, and how should the nation measure its effectiveness in
achieving them?
A broad range of scholarly and popular commentary speaks to
both of these questions and generates an equally broad range of
views. But there is consensus on several main points. The primary
objectives of a civil litigation system should be to resolve disputes,
compensate victims, and deter violations of legal standards. Key
criteria for assessing the performance of the system include its costs in
time, money, and acrimony, and its procedural and substantive
fairness. The substantive standard is, of course, the most difficult to
apply. Part of the problem in developing a reform agenda is the lack
of consensus on what constitutes reasonable outcomes, particularly in
personal injury cases. But some measure of agreement seems likely
on certain core values. One is consistency; similar cases should yield
similar results. A second is the opportunity to be heard and to obtain
some measure of individualized treatment. These are, to some extent,
competing values. Individualized opportunities are costly and
increase the likelihood of inconsistent results. But only by explicitly
addressing the tradeoffs are we likely to obtain reform strategies that
respond to Americans’ highest aspirations and most critical concerns.
Common reform proposals take three main forms. One approach
is to discourage litigation by making recovery more difficult for both
plaintiffs and their attorneys. A second strategy is to focus on better
management of legal claims. Examples include greater use of
sanctions for frivolous cases and alternative forms of dispute
resolution. A final option is to reduce the need for litigation by
creating other compensation systems or by minimizing the problems
176
that give rise to legal disputes.

174.
175.
176.

Sherrid, supra note 125, at 34.
OLSON, supra note 39, at 108; Sherrid, supra note 125, at 34.
See BURKE, supra note 3, at 27.
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The modern tort reform movement has relied primarily on the
first approach. Beginning in the 1970s, an alliance of businesses,
professional associations, insurance companies, and a few nonprofit
and governmental organizations began a major campaign to limit
177
“litigation abuse.” A second wave of reform occurred in the mid1980s and another took place in the late 1990s. A renewed push
178
emerged after the Republican election victories in 2000. Each effort
brought modest success, primarily in terms of state legislation179 and
education of judges and juries about the implications of large awards
180
for taxpayers and consumers. The main legislative reforms have
involved placing limits on punitive and noneconomic damages such as
pain and suffering, creating panels to screen medical malpractice
cases, restricting lawyers’ contingent fees, limiting venue to prevent
parties from shopping for “plaintiff-friendly” jurisdictions, and
altering the substantive tort law on matters such as the availability of
damages from “collateral” sources or from joint defendants whose
codefendants are insolvent. In the most recent campaign, additional
objectives have included federal legislation to cap pain and suffering
awards and to restrict class actions.181 Attention also has focused on
more fundamental changes, such as loser-pays proposals that would
182
make unsuccessful litigants liable for their opponents’ legal fees.
Some of these reforms create as many problems as they solve. As
noted earlier, the vast majority of tort victims are undercompensated,
not overcompensated. Only a small minority file successful claims and
the individuals most seriously injured receive the least adequate
recoveries. Limiting damages compounds these injustices. Such
limitations strike hardest at those with the most severe disabilities and

177. See id. at 29.
178. See text accompanying note 181 infra.
179. Rebeca Rodriguez, Tort Reform Narrowly Approved, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Sept. 14, 2003, at 1A.
180. BURKE, supra note 3, at 32.
181. For an overview, see generally Stephanie Francis Ward & Siobhan Morrissey, Tort
Reform Gaining Traction, Coupons, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Nov. 5, 2004, WL 3 No. 44
ABAJEREP 1. See also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, S. 5, 109th Cong. (2005); Leonard
Post, Tort Reform: Fate of 2004 Class Actions with a New Act: A Mixed Bag, NAT’L L. J. Feb. 21,
2005, at A1; David Rogers & Monica Langley, Bush Set to Sign Landmark Bill on Class Actions,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2005, at A1 (“Future civil actions will be subject to a new, more
federalized framework that would remove cases from state courts if the aggregate claims are
more than $5 million.”).
182. RHODE, supra note 1, at 129; see also CRIER, supra note 38, at 211 (arguing that “loser
pays all costs would be the biggest single change to improve our civil court system today”).
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at vulnerable individuals such as low-wage workers, full-time
homemakers, or children, whose economic losses are too modest to
183
justify litigation. Similar injustices arise with reforms that would
require most punitive damages to be paid to the state, rather than to
lawyers and injured parties.184 Moreover, the impact of such
limitations on insurance costs is modest. A Congressional Budget
Office study estimated that a national cap of $250,000 would reduce
consumers’ health insurance premiums by less than 1 percent.185
According to one medical association estimate, the effect of similar
New Jersey legislation would be to lower doctors’ premiums by only
about 5 to 7 percent.186 If, as these associations claim, America is truly
facing a malpractice crisis, these responses are scarcely adequate.
Requiring unsuccessful litigants to pay their adversaries’ legal
fees might reduce frivolous claims but at the cost of discouraging
meritorious ones as well. The parties most likely to suffer would not
be corporations, which can absorb additional legal costs as taxdeductible business expenses. The real losers would be people of
moderate means with strong but uncertain claims who could not risk
subsidizing both sides of an unsuccessful suit. Supporters of fee187
shifting initiatives seldom discuss this problem. Instead, they

183. Damage caps would also deter lawyers from taking cases that do not impair
employment, such as that of a woman who had both breasts removed because of an erroneous
lab report diagnosis of cancer. See Bob Herbert, Malpractice Myths, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2004,
at A23. There is also evidence that lawyers may be unwilling to accept cases with low economic
damages under systems that cap non-economic damages. See id.; Court, supra note 97; Rachel
Zimmerman & Joseph Hallinan, As Malpractice Caps Spread, Lawyers Turn Away Some Cases,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2004, at A1; Rhonda L. Rundle, Effect of Malpractice Caps is Tallied, WALL
ST. J., July 13, 2004, at D4.
184. For a proposal by California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger that would give the
state 75 percent of punitive damage recoveries, see Adam Liptak, Schwarzenegger Sees Money
for State in Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2004, at A12; David Wessel, California
Looks for Cash in the Courtroom, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2004, at A2. For the disincentives to
litigate claims involving punitive damages under such damage-sharing formulas, see Walter
Olsen, More Punitives to the People, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2004, at A14.
185. Eisler et al., supra note 80.
186. Id.
187. See Robert Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism?: A Preliminary Inquiry,
19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 11 (1994) (describing Americans’ “mistrust [of] concentrated power,
care about individual rights, and [belief] in private ordering” as leading to the development of
legal rules, such as the rejection of a loser-pays dynamic, that encourage access to courts); see
also Attorney Accountability Act, H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995); Common Sense Legal Reforms
Act, H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995); Glaberson, supra note 83; Glaberson supra note 121.
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emphasize that loser-pays systems are the norm in other nations.
But these countries typically have more comprehensive legal
assistance, social welfare, and health insurance programs than does
the United States. Such programs reduce reliance on privately
financed litigation to subsidize the costs of injuries, which also
reduces the chilling effects of fee liability. American advocates of feeshifting policies are also diplomatically silent about Florida’s
unsuccessful experience. After five years, the state abolished its loserpays system in medical malpractice cases. Although the threat of
additional legal fees did somewhat reduce the number of malpractice
cases filed, it also increased the number that went to trial. Plaintiffs
fought harder because the stakes were higher. And because a
significant number of losing plaintiffs had insufficient assets to pay
opponents’ costs, defendants’ overall expenses were also higher.189
Whether comparable results could be avoided under more carefully
designed systems is a complex question on which experts disagree.
But supporters of fee shifting have made little effort to educate
policymakers or the public about the complicated and uncertain
tradeoffs that their proposal would entail.190
The second type of reform proposals, which attempts to improve
management of legal disputes, holds more promise but often suffers
from the same limitations as discussions of litigiousness. The public
gets too much sweeping rhetoric and too little careful factual analysis.
Critics of the current system frequently present alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) as an all-purpose prescription. It becomes the
preferred solution for excessive expense, delay, and combativeness.
Critics of ADR offer similarly sweeping assessments. In their analysis,

188. Werner Pfenningstorf & Donald G. Gifford, Introduction to A COMPARATIVE STUDY
LIABILITY LAW AND COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED
STATES (Donald G. Gifford & William M. Richman eds. 1991).
189. See James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement under the English
and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J. L. & ECON. 225, 248 (1995) (noting evidence
from Florida suggesting adverse effects on procedural efficiency and deterrence under the loserpays rule); Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs:
Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 345, 576–78 (1990) (summarizing evidence
from Florida finding a greater likelihood of trials under loser-pay rules); infra note 190.
190. Attorney Accountability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Congress 49–66 (1995) (statement of
Professor Herbert M. Kritzer); id. at 42–47 (statement of Professor Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.).
OF
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ADR offers “apartheid justice”—a strategy for bypassing, rather than
191
addressing, inadequacies in the current structure.
To make sense of this debate, the public needs fewer categorical
pronouncements and more contextual evaluation. The last two
decades have witnessed a dramatic growth in the range and
sophistication of ADR methods, such as arbitration, mediation, and
adjudication by privately retained judges. Some recent tort reform
proposals would build on this experience by creating specialized
tribunals to hear malpractice or product liability cases. Current ADR
methods vary considerably in structure and offer different strengths
and limitations. Not all respond effectively to concerns about
litigiousness. Public debate too often relies on over- simplified or
idealized models. ADR advocates tend to compare a courtroom trial,
with all its costs, to a more informal, participatory process, with all its
virtues. From this perspective, adversarial proceedings look far less
attractive than alternatives that can assist parties to identify
underlying interests, explore possibilities for mutual gains, and
discover strategies that may prevent or resolve future disputes.192
Yet as ADR critics note, 85 to 95 percent of civil cases never get
193
to trial and many ADR processes are no less costly or contentious
than traditional adjudication.194 For example, proceedings before
privately selected arbiters, judges, or jury panels rely on conventional
adversarial frameworks. Opportunities for delay and obfuscation are
comparable to those plaguing current litigation processes.195
Imbalances of wealth, power, and information may skew outcomes

191. NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 299–300; Robert Gnaizda, Secret Justice for the
Privileged Few, 66 JUDICATURE 6, 11 (1982); see Owen Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (“Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining:
Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the absence
of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and although
dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done.”).
192. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, In Search of “Good” Mediation: Rhetoric, Practice
and Empiricism, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 231 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee
Hamilton eds., 2000) (exploring the “effects of implementing different mediation paradigms for
resolving civil legal disputes.”).
193. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339–40 (1994).
194. See Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 54, 58
(describing costs in time, money, and contentiousness).
195. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 177 (1988); Reuben, supra note 194, at 58; see Judith Resnik, Failing Faith:
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 553 (1986) (noting that some
“problems associated with judge-sponsored settlements arise within the ADR context as well”).
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under any dispute resolution system, including ones that rely on
196
nonadversarial approaches. Research comparing mediation and
adjudication does not find consistent differences in costs, speed, or
197
participant satisfaction.
Rather, this research underscores the importance of context both
in structuring and evaluating dispute resolution processes. Problems
are most likely to surface in arbitration, mediation, and screening
processes that are mandatory rather than voluntary, or that fail to
address major disparities in power and resources. For example,
compulsory workplace arbitration systems that involve employers
who are repeat players often systematically disadvantage employees
198
who are not. In one study involving such systems, the odds of an
employer victory were about 5 to 1.199 Only repeat players had
incentives to investigate the records of ostensibly “neutral”
200
decisionmakers to identify possible biases. Even when parties are
more evenly matched, ADR is not always a desirable substitute for
adjudication. Processes designed to satisfy private parties lack public
accountability and may undervalue public interests.201 ADR methods
do not require appointed or elected officials to enforce norms that are
202
subject to democratic or judicial oversight. Informal procedures
aimed at private settlements may provide insufficient development of
legal precedents or inadequate deterrence of unlawful conduct.203

196. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1391 (“ADR is no safe haven for the
poor and powerless.”).
197. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY
NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT: A SUMMARY 4–7 (1996).
For mixed results, see the studies cited in Reuben, supra note 194, at 56–59, and Deborah R.
Hensler, Puzzling Over ADR: Drawing Meaning from the RAND Report, DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Summer 1997, at 8, 9.
198. Reuben, supra note 194, at 61.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at
Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 297, 346 (1996) (“Although privatized ADR has the advantage of removing certain
disputes or even whole classes of disputes from the admittedly crowded judicial system, it holds
substantial potential for unfairness at least so long as judicial review of private arbitration
remains highly deferential.” (footnote omitted)).
202. See Fiss, supra note 191, at 1085 (arguing that the judiciary cannot give force to the
public values reflected in statutes and constitutions when disputes are resolved without trial).
203. LIND & TYLER, supra note 195, at 122; Fiss, supra note 191, at 1085; David Luban,
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622–23 (1995).
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Yet the issue in evaluating legal processes should always be,
“Compared to what?” Critics who denounce ADR as second-class
justice need to consider how often first-class is available, and on what
terms. The deficiencies common in ADR are also chronic in
conventional adjudication. Private settlements are the norm, not the
exception, and procedural protections that are available in theory are
often unavailable in practice. Imbalances of wealth, power, and
information skew outcomes even in cases receiving the closest judicial
oversight. As the title of Professor Marc Galanter’s now-classic article
204
put it, the “‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead” in most legal settings.
If any single lesson emerges from the burgeoning research on
dispute resolution, it is that no single method is uniformly superior.
Yet the current legal process is heavily weighted in favor of a single
adversarial structure, which does not always serve the interests of
either participants or the public. What the nation needs instead is a
broader range of procedural choices and the information necessary to
make them; more innovation and evaluation should be priorities.
Proposals along these lines are not in short supply. Many ADR
experts have developed promising blueprints for “multidoor
205
courthouses” that would “fit the forum to the fuss.” These
courthouses would allocate different types of cases to appropriate
dispute resolution processes based on several basic criteria: the nature
of the controversy, the novelty or complexity of the relevant law, the
relationship between the parties, the priorities that the participants
attach to various features of the dispute resolution process, and the
societal interests at issue.206 Cases involving relatively small monetary
damages and the application of settled legal precedents may not
justify the expense of full-scale adjudication. In other contexts, the
relationship between the parties may argue for procedures that are
best able to address power disparities or to foster long-term working
relationships. Specialized tribunals may be appropriate when subjectmatter expertise and experience are critical to ensuring reasonable

204. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 95 (1974).
205. Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A UserFriendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49, 67 (1994); see Frank
E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address Delivered at the National Conference on
the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7–9, 1976), in 70
F.R.D. 111, 118–26 (1976) (outlining several criteria for dispute resolution).
206. Sander, supra note 205.
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207
and consistent treatment of similar cases. Development of special
substantive rules, such as an adequate standardized formula for pain
and suffering damages, could assist such tribunals in reaching more
uniform awards that would not penalize low-income victims.208
A related, but more fundamental, reform strategy would be to
replace the litigation/ADR structure with a more streamlined no-fault
compensation system. Many other countries have successfully
implemented such systems in areas such as personal injury,
209
discrimination, and administrative benefits. These processes often
make lawyers unnecessary and provide effective remedies with
minimal transaction costs. The United States has adopted similar
systems in a few contexts, such as workplace accidents and the
September 11 terrorist attacks.210 Some private institutions have also
attempted to preempt litigation by creating their own no-fault
reimbursement funds. For example, a small but growing number of
hospitals and insurance companies have an “honesty policy” under
which they inform patients of mistakes and provide compensation for
lost wages and medical expenses.211 Experience to date suggests that
these policies are highly cost-effective.212 Many experts have
advocated analogous specialized tribunals and streamlined no-fault
213
compensation structures for “adverse medical events.” Such systems
could offer a number of advantages over malpractice litigation: more

207. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 135–38 (describing the Japanese treatment of automobile
tort cases: a predictable system of prompt official investigation, clear damages formulas, and
legal standards fixed by statute); id. at 238 (describing Wisconsin’s heightened administrative
control over workers’ compensation cases).
208. See id. at 137–39, 238, 275.
209. See id. at 137–39.
210. BURKE, supra note 3, at 39.
211. Julie Appleby, Insurer, Hospitals Try Apologies for Errors, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2003,
at B5; Eisler et al., supra note 80; Rachel Zimmerman, Doctors’ New Tool To Fight Lawsuits:
Saying “I’m Sorry,” WALL ST. J., May 18, 2004, at A1.
212. See Appleby, supra note 211; Zimmerman, supra note 211.
213. See Mello & Brennan, supra note 112, at 1626–28 (“We advocate a shift to a system
emphasizing greater enterprise liability . . . [including] a limited no-fault compensation
scheme . . . such that claims that [fall] within a predefined class of avoidable adverse events
would be automatically paid by the insurer without a formal finding of negligence.”). For
discussion of specialized medical malpractice courts with expert judges that would screen claims
or award compensation, see John Gibeaut, The Med-Mal Divide, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2005, at 39, 40–
42 (2005); Lindsay Furtado, States Weigh Med-Mal Courts, NAT’L L. J., Dec 13, 2004, at A5;
Philip K. Howard, Yes, It’s a Mess—But Here’s How to Fix It, TIME, June 9, 2003, at 62, 62;
Betsy McCaughey, Medical Courts Would Heal Infirmities of Legal System, INVESTOR’S BUS.
DAILY, July 17, 2003, at A15.
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timely remedies, coverage for a broader group of victims, and lower
transaction costs.
Whether no-fault frameworks would provide adequate
deterrence of negligent conduct in other personal injury contexts has
provoked considerable debate. Much would depend on the details of
the systems and surrounding legal culture. However, in the case of
medical malpractice, some evidence suggests that no-fault
frameworks could result in more frequent reporting of errors and give
providers greater incentives to reduce all preventable injuries, not just
the injuries demonstrably linked to negligence.214 For a health care
system that now causes somewhere between forty-four thousand and
ninety-eight thousand avoidable patient deaths annually, this would
be a significant benefit.215
A rational reform agenda would provide more experimentation
with no-fault frameworks, specialized tribunals, and other ADR
approaches, as well as more systematic information about their
effectiveness. How well do different models serve societal goals
concerning efficiency, deterrence, fairness, cost, and accessibility?
Granting the risks of superficial cross-cultural comparisons, what can
reformers learn from other countries’ approaches to similar legal
problems? Although more adequate data are necessary, the research
available suggests that expanding procedural options is a move in the
right direction.216 Parties’ satisfaction with the legal process is heavily
dependent on assessments of its procedural fairness; opportunities for
direct participation, not mediated through lawyers, can increase
perceptions of fairness.217 Most individuals prefer to handle legal
grievances in informal, out-of-court settings and to have more control
218
over the process than is possible in litigation. Expanding ADR also

214. Mello & Brennan, supra note 112, at 1629–30; ROBERT M. WACHTER & KAVH G.
SHOJANIA, INTERNAL BLEEDING: THE TRUTH BEHIND AMERICA’S TERRIFYING EPIDEMIC OF
MEDICAL MISTAKES 342–46 (2004) (discussing the advantages of a no-fault framework).
215. See Eisler et al., supra note 80 (citing a 1999 study by the Institute of Medicine
estimating numbers of patient deaths).
216. See generally Sanders, supra note 152.
217. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 195, at 102–04 (citing studies finding that the
opportunity to present one’s views and arguments improves perceptions of justice).
218. See HAZEL G. GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT
GOING TO LAW 254–55 (1999) (“In finding pathways to solutions, members of the public want
routes that are quick, cheap, and relatively stress-free.”); Stempel, supra note 201, at 353–54
(suggesting that “an institutionalized ADR system with a mediation-arbitration-litigation
continuum” not only facilitates “voluntary resolution, but also provides sufficient
decisionmaking procedure and authority to satisfy many litigants”).
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introduces a measure of beneficial competition. If individuals have
choices, they have greater leverage in making their needs heard and
in enhancing the quality of the options available.
A final cluster of reform strategies should focus on the
misconduct that breeds excessive litigation and related abuses. For
example, more effective disciplinary processes for doctors and
lawyers could help address the roots of the problem. Some research
suggests that, over the last decade, 5 percent of physicians have been
responsible for one-third of malpractice awards and settlements. It
does not, of course, follow that these doctors are responsible for a
similarly disproportionate share of the vast number of medical errors
that never result in claims. Nor are many of these errors the products
of individual negligence. But a system that more effectively weeded
out practitioners with a history of incompetence would produce
substantial savings in lives and dollars. Further progress could come
from building more incentives for quality control into malpractice
insurance rates and health care regulation. Avoidable errors could be
reduced through improvements in prevention and oversight
219
structures.
Courts, bar associations, and legislatures could also do more to
curb excessive legal fees and frivolous cases. Closer judicial scrutiny
and more stringent contingent fee standards could help limit lawyers’
charges to a reasonable return for work performed and risk
assumed.220 Greater efforts should focus on preventing suits with little
merit from remaining financially advantageous for counsel. Courts
could, for example, require that percentage fees in class actions be
based on the damages that class members actually receive, rather than
221
on the theoretical value of unredeemed coupons. Another strategy,
reflected in some state statutes and proposed legislation, would be to
provide more limits on the percentage formula that lawyers can
charge, based primarily on how far the case progresses and how timeconsuming preparation becomes. Under such a system, in a matter
settled without filing suit, lawyers could collect only 25 percent of the
recovery. In a case settled after filing, their share could not exceed
219. See Mello & Brennan, supra note 112, at 1628 (advocating an “engineering approach to
error prevention,” in which technology is used to help prevent avoidable mistakes).
220. RHODE, supra note 1, at 178.
221. See Peter Blumberg, Keeping a Secret, S.F. DAILY J., Sept. 13, 2003, at A1; Coyle, supra
note 171; Martha Neil, Texas Clips Coupons, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Nov. 22, 2002, WL 1 No. 45
ABAJEREP 1 (discussing a Texas law requiring that lawyers in coupon-payout class actions be
paid in coupons as well).
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one-third, and in a case that went to trial, lawyers could collect 40
222
percent. Reasonable fee ceilings or taxes on excessive fees could be
appropriate in contexts involving huge windfall recoveries, such as the
223
Disciplinary agencies could also impose
tobacco litigation.
significant sanctions on attorneys who repeatedly filed meritless suits
or charged extortionate fees. In California’s first such effort, the bar
sought suspension of three attorneys who held small businesses
hostage for payoff settlements in unfair competition cases.224 It should
not, however, have taken some three thousand claims, with boiler
plate pleadings and no investigation of the underlying facts, to trigger
disciplinary action.225
CONCLUSION
The greatest difficulty in developing an effective litigation reform
agenda is political, not conceptual. Innovative ideas and promising
models are readily available. But what the country does lack is an
informed public committed to addressing the justice system’s most
fundamental problems and the forces that perpetuate them. Policy
debates have been hijacked by skewed information and special
interests. Lawyers seeking maximum fees, businesses seeking
maximum profits, and physicians seeking minimum liability have
invested vast efforts in pushing their own agendas. Few of the reform
proposals that seem remotely plausible are likely to produce the
result that most Americans want: a dispute resolution system that is
efficient, equitable, and affordable. Significant progress is unlikely
until more disinterested players enter the arena and give the public a
better understanding of the most serious problems and plausible

222. LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 148; Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of
Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM. L. REV. 247, 305–08 (1996).
223. For such proposals, see Susan Beck, Giveback Time, AM. LAW., Aug. 2003, at 15
(discussing an attempt by Republicans in Congress to legislate repossession of much of the legal
fees awarded from the tobacco settlement). See also Coyle, supra note 171; 20 ABA/BNA
LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 285 (2004) (discussing the United States
Senate’s rejection of a proposed legislation that would impose a 200 percent excise tax on
tobacco lawyers’ fees that exceeded $20,000 per hour). For the kind of windfalls justifying such
an approach, see Beam, supra note 146.
224. Monte Morin, Three Lawyers Suspended over Flood of Suits, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2003,
at B1. But see Michael Hytha, “People’s Lawyer” Gets Mild Penalty from State Bar, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 8, l997, at A19 (noting the instance of one lawyer who charged 46 percent
contingency fees in small claims cases and collected fees for arranging insurance payments, but
who merely received a private reproof from the state bar).
225. Morin, supra note 224.
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prescriptions. H.L. Mencken was right that “what ails the truth is that
226
it is mainly uncomfortable and often dull.” The litigiousness debate
is no exception. Frivolous cases make entertaining reading but a
misleading blueprint for reform.

226.

RHODE, supra note 1, at 130.

